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The Relational Impact of Social Rights Judgments: 
A Trust-Based Analysis* 
David Vitale† 
[The final version of this article is forthcoming in Legal Studies.] 
There is a growing body of scholarship examining the impact of courts’ social rights 
judgments, especially their distributive impact (ie, the extent to which they deliver social 
rights-related goods and services to the poor and marginalised). Commentators have used 
this impact to evaluate the effectiveness of courts in realising citizens’ social rights. This 
article contributes to the scholarship by adding a new ‘relational’ dimension to our 
understanding of such impact. It uses the literature on the concept of trust from philosophy, 
sociology and other disciplines to analyse the impact that social rights judgments have on 
the relationship between citizens and the political branches of government, and argues that 
social rights judgments can modify two elements of this relationship that determine the 
dynamics at play in it: citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches with respect to the 
relevant goods and services, and citizens’ uncertainty about the political branches’ 
exercise of control over the goods and services (which can promote the political branches’ 
trustworthiness). By broadening our understanding of these judgments’ impact, the article 
offers a valuable lens through which to analyse social rights judgments and adds needed 
nuance to current debates about courts’ effectiveness in realising citizens’ social rights.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the global rise of constitutionalised and justiciable social rights (rights to housing, 
education, health and social security),1 researchers are increasingly examining the impact of 
courts’ judgments enforcing these rights. This growing body of work focuses largely on the 
judgments’ distributive impact (ie, the extent to which they deliver social rights-related goods 
and services to the poor and marginalised).2 And commentators have used this distributive 
impact to evaluate the effectiveness of courts in realising citizens’ social rights. For example, 
Latin American courts’ judgments enforcing the right to health, which have disproportionately 
benefited in material terms the relatively wealthy and non-marginalised, have been criticised 
for their ‘regressive effects’,3 and are regarded as a ‘betrayal or capture’ of the right to health.4 
Or the fact that Irene Grootboom, the claimant in the famous South African right-to-housing 
 
1 C Jung, R Hirschl and E Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions’ (2014) 62 Am J of 
Comparative Law 1043; E Rosevear, R Hirschl and C Jung, ‘Justiciable and Aspirational Economic and Social 
Rights in National Constitutions’ in KG Young (ed) The Future of Economic and Social Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019) p 37. 
2 See DM Brinks and V Gauri, ‘The Law’s Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Judializing Social and 
Economic Rights’ (2014) 12 Perspectives on Politics 375; J Dugard, ‘Courts and Structural Poverty in South 
Africa: To What Extent Has the Constitutional Court Expanded Access and Remedies to the Poor?’ in DB 
Maldonado (ed) Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and 
Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p 293; OLM Ferraz, ‘The Right to Health in the Courts 
of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights 33; OLM Ferraz, ‘Harming the 
Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from Brazil’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Rev 1643; OLM Ferraz, Health 
as a Human Right: The Politics and Judicialisation of Health in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2021); FF Hoffmann and FRNM Bentes, ‘Accountability for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil’ in V Gauri 
and DM Brinks (eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p 100; D Landau, ‘The Reality of Social 
Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law J 189; S Shankar, ‘The Embedded Negotiators: India’s 
Higher Judiciary and Socioeconomic Rights’ in DB Maldonado (ed) Constitutionalism of the Global South: The 
Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p 95. 
For some exceptions, see M Pieterse, ‘Health, Social Movements, and Rights-based Litigation in South Africa’ 
(2008) 35 J of Law and Society 364; C Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial 
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Rev 1669. 
3
 See OLM Ferraz, ‘Social Rights, Judicial Remedies and the Poor’ (2019) 18(3) Washington University Global 
Studies Law Rev 569; Ferraz (2021), ibid. 
4
 See D Landau and R Dixon, ‘Constitutional Non-Transformation? Socioeconomic Rights Beyond the Poor?’ in 
Young, above n 1, p 110. 
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case, died without ever receiving the public housing for which she fought has been used as a 
basis for critiquing the Constitutional Court and its approach to enforcing social rights.5 
However, courts’ social rights judgments have impact beyond distributive effects of 
this sort. As César Rodriguez-Garavito stresses, ‘to capture the full range of effects of court 
decisions, impact studies need to enlarge the conventional theoretical and methodological 
fields of vision’, paying attention to not only the ‘direct material effects of court orders’ but 
additionally ‘the broader impact’.6 This article adds a new dimension to our understanding of 
impact by analysing what I will call the ‘relational’ impact of social rights judgments. By this 
I mean that in addition to their distributive impact, social rights judgments have consequences 
which help redefine the relationships that are engaged by social rights. They can modify certain 
elements that determine the dynamics at play in those relationships, thereby altering those 
dynamics. These consequences follow, as I will show, from how courts interpret social rights 
provisions and the remedies that they order in response to violations of the rights.  
For instance, in the Grootboom case, the South African Constitutional Court set out for 
the first time its ‘reasonableness review’ approach to enforcing its constitution’s social rights. 
The court held that the right to housing in section 26 obliged the state ‘to devise and implement 
a coherent, co-ordinated programme’ for public housing and that the court, in enforcing the 
right, would subject the relevant programmes to a standard of reasonableness.7 And as I will 
explain later, though Irene Grootboom never received public housing in her lifetime, this 
approach to social rights enforcement – by modifying elements of the relationship between the 
South African government and its citizens – altered the dynamics at play in that relationship. 
 
5
 See J Berger, ‘Litigating for Social Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education’ 
in Gauri and Brinks, above n 2, pp 81-82; K Pillay, ‘Implementing Grootboom: Supervision Needed’ (2002) 3 
ESR Review 13. 
6 Rodriguez-Garavito, above n 2, pp 1675-1676. See also C Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond Enforcement: Assessing 
and Enhancing Judicial Impact’ in Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito and Rossi, above n 2, p 82. 
7
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19, at [95], [41]. 
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In this article, I analyse the impact that social rights judgments have on a particular 
relationship – that between citizens and the political branches of government (which I will call 
the ‘citizen-government relationship’).8 I have chosen this relationship for two reasons. First, 
my primary objective in this article is to contribute to the literature on the enforcement of social 
rights by courts. Since the focus of that literature is on how courts mediate the citizen-
government relationship, it makes sense to focus my relational impact analysis on that 
relationship. Second, and relatedly, owing to reasons of capacity and democratic legitimacy, it 
is reasonable to say, as most commentators have, that the political branches have primary 
responsibility for the realisation of citizens’ social rights.9 And courts, in enforcing the relevant 
rights and delivering their social rights judgments, oversee the citizen-government relationship 
(alongside, of course, other actors, including administrative tribunals and ombudsmen). 
By adding this relational dimension, this article contributes to current debates about 
courts’ effectiveness in realising citizens’ social rights. As Daniel Brinks says, ‘[w]hether we 
think courts are “effective” … depends on our prior expectations’.10 If we expect social rights 
judgments to deliver social rights-related goods and services to the poor and marginalised, then 
the Latin American and South African experiences detailed above support a thesis, at least in 
part, of courts’ ineffectiveness. I propose, however, in line with scholarship advocating more 
 
8
 I am assuming a social democracy in which social rights are constitutionalised (and so, owed to citizens); thus, 
I do not address why the state owes its citizens social rights or the role that trust plays in the state granting such 
rights. For relevant work on those issues, see LS Underkuffler, ‘Property, Sovereignty, and the Public Trust’ 
(2017) 18 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 329; LS Underkuffler, ‘Fiduciary Theory: The Missing Piece for Positive 
Rights’ in E Criddle (ed) Fiduciary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) p 96. Further, I 
do not mean ‘citizens’ in the sense of citizenship as legal status. Rather, I use the term to refer to that group of 
individuals who are afforded the constitutional protection of social rights. Such individuals may include residents 
or those of other legal status. 
9 See R Gargarella, ‘Deliberative Democracy, Dialogic Justice and the Promise of Social and Economic Rights’ 
in HA Garcia, K Klare and LA Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical 
Inquiries (New York: Routledge, 2015) p 108; C Gearty, ‘Against Judicial Enforcement’ in C Gearty and V 
Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2010) p 1; J King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) p 41; V Mantouvalou, ‘In Support of Legalisation’ in C Gearty and V 
Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2010) p 89; C O’Cinneide, ‘Legal Accountability and Social 
Justice’ in N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds) Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) p 400. 
10 Brinks, above n 2, p 476. 
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relational and less individualistic approaches to law,11 that broadening our understanding of 
impact to include relational impact enables us to think more deeply about what social rights 
judgments can, and should, achieve. As Jennifer Nedelsky has stated, ‘people will do a better 
job of making all the difficult decisions involving rights if they focus on the kinds of 
relationships they actually want to foster, what the values at stake in that fostering are, and how 
different concepts and institutions will best contribute to that fostering.’12 
I do not mean to suggest in this article that social rights judgments’ distributive impact 
is not relevant or is less relevant than their relational impact. Rather, this article, by broadening 
our understanding of impact, encourages us to rethink our expectations about these judgments, 
and in turn brings much-needed nuance to our evaluations of courts’ effectiveness in realising 
the relevant rights. Accordingly, in line with Nedelsky’s statement, I encourage readers to 
reflect on ‘the kind of’ citizen-government relationship that they ‘want to foster’ and how 
courts – as an institution that oversees that relationship – can ‘contribute to that fostering’. 
For my relational impact analysis, I draw on the literature on the concept of trust from 
philosophy, sociology and other disciplines to illustrate two specific forms of relational impact 
that social rights judgments can have on the citizen-government relationship. Using that 
literature, I argue that courts’ social rights judgments can modify two elements of the citizen-
government relationship: citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches with respect to social 
rights-related goods and services, and citizens’ uncertainty about the political branches’ 
exercise of control over those goods and services.13 More specifically, I illustrate how social 
rights judgments can (i) mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches with respect 
 
11 See J Herring, Law and the Relational Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); R Leckey, 
Contextual Subjects: Family, State, and Relational Theory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); J 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
12 Nedelsky, ibid, pp 237-238. 
13 See CA Heimer, ‘Solving the Problem of Trust’ in KS Cook (ed) Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2001) p 40. 
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to the relevant goods and services, and (ii) reduce citizens’ uncertainty about how the political 
branches will exercise their control over those goods and services in a way that promotes the 
political branches’ ‘trustworthiness’ with respect to social rights. It must be noted, however, 
that these two forms of impact are neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive: they merely 
illustrate how courts’ social rights judgments can impact the citizen-government relationship. 
To be clear, my argument is theoretical, not empirical. Unlike the variables studied in 
most impact literature to date, the framing and parameters of vulnerability and uncertainty are 
not self-evident. The concepts are also not easily measured. Any attempt to measure them 
would face significant challenges.14 Hence, I advance in this article a theoretical argument 
rooted in the literature on trust about what we can reasonably expect the impact of different 
social rights judgments to be on the citizen-government relationship. My argument is also not 
prescriptive. That is, I do not claim that social rights judgments ought to have one relational 
impact over another. And lastly, my argument assumes compliance from the political branches 
with the relevant social rights judgments.15 Of course, such compliance is not a given, with 
governments often flouting judicial orders.16 This does not, however, diminish the value of this 
article’s relational impact analysis, especially as it pertains to the literature on the enforcement 
of social rights. In evaluating an approach to judicially enforce social rights, it is beneficial to 
consider how that approach plays out under ideal circumstances. It provides an indication of 
the best that approach can offer in terms of the relevant form of impact – in this case, its 
 
14 For example, it would depend on one’s conceptualisation of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘uncertainty’. This is a weakness 
of the empirical literature on public trust in government: see KS Cook, R Hardin and M Levi, Cooperation Without 
Trust? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005) p 164. Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
control for the singular impact of social rights judgments: see DWL Wang, ‘From Wednesbury Unreasonableness 
to Accountability for Reasonableness’ (2017) 76 Cambridge Law J 642 at 658. 
15 On the distinction between ‘impact’ and ‘compliance’, see M Langford, C Rodriguez-Garavito and J Rossi, 
‘Introduction: From Jurisprudence to Compliance’ in Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito and Rossi, above n 2, p 3; 
Rodriguez-Garavito, above n 6. That said, the compliance of the political branches can arguably be improved by 
courts using ‘stronger’ remedies, including supervisory and contempt orders. 
16 See DM Brinks, ‘Solving the Problem of (Non)compliance in Social and Economic Rights Litigation’ in 
Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito and Rossi, ibid, p 475; A Chilton and M Versteeg, ‘Rights Without Resources: 
The Impact of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending’ (2017) 60 J of Law and Economics 713 at 720; 
Pillay, above n 5. 
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relational impact, specifically on the citizen-government relationship. Here, compliance from 
the political branches represents ideal circumstances. That said, any future normative argument 
that draws on this relational impact analysis to advocate a specific approach to social rights 
enforcement must factor in the real-word possibility of non-compliance from the political 
branches, including how to improve such compliance to realise the relevant consequences. 
The article is organised as follows. In section 2, I lay the foundation for my relational 
impact argument by describing the nature of the citizen-government relationship. In particular, 
I detail the power asymmetries in that relationship, with its corresponding vulnerability and 
uncertainty of citizens. Section 3 of the article is the core of my argument. Drawing on the 
literature on trust and using social rights cases globally to illustrate, I explain how social rights 
judgments can have the two forms of impact that I have identified. And section 4 concludes. 
2. VULNERABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE CITIZEN-GOVERNMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
In any social democracy, there is a relationship between citizens and the political branches with 
respect to social welfare. Citizens pay taxes to the state, and the state, using the revenue 
collected from those taxes, provides citizens with a range of goods and services by delivering 
social welfare programmes. Constitutional social rights afford citizens constitutional protection 
vis-à-vis such goods and services, and they establish corresponding obligations on the state.17 
This constitutional arrangement gives rise to what I call the ‘citizen-government relationship’. 
 My focus in this article is constitutional social rights – that is, those social rights that 
are protected under a national constitution, either expressly or implicitly (and read into the 
relevant constitution by a court). They are my focus, in significant part, because they have been 
 
17
 In referring to ‘social rights’, I am concerned mainly with rights to housing, education, health and social 
security; and in line with the orthodoxy in the social rights literature, I am not concerned with labour rights. 
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the focus of the literature on the distributive impact of social rights judgments, with that 
literature centring on the jurisdictions of South Africa, Brazil and Colombia, in particular. That 
said, the argument that I advance on the relational impact of social rights judgments is not 
necessarily limited to constitutional social rights. Courts’ enforcement or application of other 
social rights (eg, legislative social rights) can likewise have the relational impact that I describe. 
 As I indicated earlier, the political branches assume primary responsibility for realising 
citizens’ social rights. The legislature contributes amendments to and promulgates the primary 
legislation that defines the parameters of state-delivered social welfare programmes.18 It also 
endorses the budget that allows the state to fund, and deliver, the programmes. The executive, 
a category in which I include civil servants and the many administrative agencies relevant to 
social welfare, prepares the bulk of primary legislation introduced to the legislature, and 
supplements, amplifies and implements that legislation via a range of administrative action.19 
Citizens are necessarily vulnerable to the political branches with respect to social rights-
related goods and services. This vulnerability follows on from three features of the citizen-
government relationship.20 The first is the fact that citizens need the relevant goods and 
services. Social rights promise those goods and services that citizens need to lead a decent 
life.21 Therefore, I will proceed under the assumption that the relevant goods and services are 
needed by citizens. Second, citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches follows on from the 
control that the political branches exercise over the goods and services.22 This control is 
exercised via the various legislative and administrative steps described above.23 These 
 
18 King, above n 9, pp 41, 44. 
19 Ibid, pp. 44-48; Lorne Sossin, ‘Boldly Going Where No Law Has Gone Before: Call Centres, Intake Scripts, 
Database Fields, and Discretionary Justice in Social Assistance’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law J 363 at 364-365. 
20 For more on these three features, see D Vitale, ‘A Trust Network Model for Social Rights Fulfilment’ (2018) 
38 Oxford J of Legal Studies 706. 
21 C Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) p 7; King, above n 9, p 17.  
22 See O’Cinneide, above n 9, p 400. 
23 King, above n 9; P Macklem, ‘Social Rights in Canada’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross (eds) Exploring Social 
Rights: Between Theory and Practice (London: Bloomsbury, 2007); M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: 
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legislative and administrative steps are prerequisites to the relevant social welfare programmes. 
And lastly, citizens are vulnerable to the political branches owing to the latter’s discretion in 
exercising that control. As Kenneth Culp Davis explains, a ‘public officer has discretion 
whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible 
courses of action or inaction’.24 Leaving aside for the moment any constraints imposed by the 
courts in enforcing social rights (which I do consider later), both political branches undoubtedly 
exercise discretion. The legislature can choose to approve (or not approve) the executive’s 
proposed budget, and it can choose to promulgate (or not or propose amendments to) legislation 
put before it.25 Administrative decision-makers also exercise significant discretion, including 
discretion that is expressly afforded to them under statute, interpretive discretion that arises 
from vague or ambiguous statutory language, and the various ‘administrative choices’ that 
comprise the administrative decision-making process.26 And while it is true that this discretion 
can be restrained by express constitutional language, given the vagueness with which social 
rights are often formulated, such restraint is in most circumstances minimal.27 
These three features generate vulnerability in citizens toward the political branches as 
the political branches, in exercising their control, may or may not choose to provide the relevant 
goods and services to citizens. In other words, the political branches hold power over citizens. 
And as a result, citizens may not be able to obtain the goods and services that they need – at 
least not from the state. To be fair, vulnerability and power in the citizen-government 
relationship operate in both directions. The political branches are likewise vulnerable to 
 
Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2008); K Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
24 KC Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) 
p 4. For similar definitions of discretion, see DJ Galligan, Discretionary Power: A Legal Study of Official 
Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) p 21; RE Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the 
Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) p 18; J Jowell, ‘The Legal Control of Administrative 
Discretion’ (1973) 18 PL 178 at 179. 
25 King, above n 9, pp 250-286. 
26 RE Goodin, ‘Welfare, Rights and Discretion’ (1986) 6 Oxford J of Legal Studies 232; RM Titmuss, ‘Welfare 
“Rights”, Law and Discretion’ (1971) 42 The Political Q 113; Sossin, above n 19. 
27 King, above n 9, pp 100-106. 
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citizens who, owing to their voting rights (if any), have the power to remove government 
officials from office. However, this power is limited because it is exercised infrequently (ie, 
whenever elections are held) and some citizens – especially the poor and marginalised – have 
limited influence over the democratic process.28 It is for this reason that the enforcement of 
social rights by courts, it has long been argued, is so important: it offers poor and marginalised 
citizens an alternative forum in which their interests may be better protected, and it 
supplements the political accountability that follows from voting, with legal accountability.29 
To be clear, what I am characterising as ‘vulnerability’ has been described more 
specifically as ‘dependence’.30 Both Susan Dodds and Margaret Urban Walker, in their work 
on vulnerability, define ‘dependence’ as vulnerability to a specific person given a certain 
relationship. For Dodds, ‘[d]ependence is vulnerability that requires the support of a specific 
person (or people)’, in contrast to ‘those vulnerabilities that do not involve immediate reliance 
on specific individuals’.31 And similarly, for Walker, ‘dependence’ means that the actor who 
‘holds control of the vulnerability stands in a particular sort of relation to the one who has the 
vulnerability’.32 While I could use the term ‘dependence’, I have chosen to use the language of 
‘vulnerability’ to be consistent with the terminology used in the literature on trust. 
 Relatedly, owing to the political branches’ discretion, citizens are also uncertain about 
the political branches’ exercise of control over the relevant goods and services. This uncertainty 
exists on multiple levels. There is, of course, citizens’ uncertainty about the outcome of the 
 
28
 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) p 34; King, ibid, pp 157-169; Paul O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International 
Standards and Comparative Experiences (New York: Routledge, 2013) p 5; Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘A Realpolitik 
Defense of Social Rights’ (2004) 82 Texas L Rev 1921 at 1926-1927. 
29
 Gargarella, above n 9, pp 107-108; King, above n 9, p 60; O’Cinneide, above n 9, pp 406-407. 
30 S Dodds, ‘Dependence, Care and Vulnerability’ in C MacKenzie, W Rogers and S Dodds (eds) Vulnerability: 
New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p 181; MU Walker, 
Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also MA 
Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale J of Law and 
Feminism 1. 
31 Dodds, ibid, pp 182-83. 
32 Walker, above n 31, p 90. 
 11 
political branches’ exercise of control. Whenever a political decision is made, there is 
inevitably uncertainty that a citizen will not receive what she wants from the political process.33 
In social rights matters, there is a limited budget available to the political branches in funding 
and delivering the relevant goods and services. Governments cannot fund and deliver every 
good and service to every citizen; and as a result, some citizens will necessarily be left unhappy 
or dissatisfied with the political process’s outcome. There is also citizens’ uncertainty about 
how the political branches will exercise their control. The relevant political actors may, for 
instance, not follow fair procedures or not base their decisions on the best available evidence.34 
3. TWO ILLUSTRATIONS OF RELATIONAL IMPACT 
This vulnerability and uncertainty give rise to two forms of relational impact that social rights 
judgments can have on the citizen-government relationship. Here, I explain those forms. 
(a) Mitigating citizens’ vulnerability 
Via their social rights judgments, courts can modify citizens’ vulnerability to the political 
branches with respect to social rights-related goods and services. As I briefly explain later in 
this section, courts can both mitigate and augment citizens’ vulnerability to the political 
branches. For this illustration, however, I focus on the former – that is, the mitigation of 
citizens’ vulnerability. I do so for two reasons. First, as should become apparent with the 
following analysis, I think that courts are much more likely to mitigate citizens’ vulnerability 
than augment it. Second, recall that one of the central aims of this article is to encourage readers 
 
33 See Gearty, above n 9, pp 53-54. See also J Mansbridge, ‘Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with 
U.S. Government’ in JS Nye Jr, PD Zelikow and DC King (eds) Why People Don’t Trust Government (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997) p 134; ME Warren, ‘Democratic Theory and Trust’ in ME Warren (ed) 
Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p 311. 
34
 Again, this leaves aside constraints imposed by courts in enforcing social rights: see K Roach and G Budlender, 
‘Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When Is It Appropriate, Just and Equitable?’ (2005) 122 South 
African Law J 325; King, above n 9, pp 166-167. See also M Levi, ‘A State of Trust’ in V Braithwaite and M 
Levi (eds) Trust & Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) p 95; Warren, ibid, pp 311-313. 
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to reflect on the kind of citizen-government relationship that they want to foster: most readers, 
I assume, would not want to foster a relationship in which citizens are more vulnerable. 
While all citizens are vulnerable to the political branches owing to their shared need for 
the goods and services (as detailed above), they are not equally so. A citizen’s vulnerability to 
the political branches depends on whether that citizen can obtain the relevant good or service 
from an alternative source – that is, a source other than the political branches. If, on the one 
hand, the political branches are a citizen’s only source of a social rights-related good or service, 
the political branches maintain exclusive control over that good or service. And that exclusive 
control opens the citizen up to extreme vulnerability. The citizen is at the mercy of the political 
branches with respect to that good or service. Should the political branches refuse to provide 
the citizen with the good or service, she is denied it – a good or service that she needs. If, on 
the other hand, the citizen has the option of obtaining the good or service from an alternative 
source, the citizen’s vulnerability to the political branches is less. In this case, if the political 
branches refuse to provide the good or service to the citizen, while that citizen may suffer some 
harm in the form of inconvenience, time or cost, she is not denied the good or service. Rather, 
she has the option of turning to the alternative source for the good or service that she needs. 
The most obvious example of such an alternative source is a private provider. In 
contemporary social democracies, governments rarely maintain exclusive control over the 
goods and services that citizens need: there is often available to citizens a private market for 
the goods and services – at least for those citizens who can afford to obtain the goods and 
services in that private market.35 And following on from what I said above, where a citizen can 
access a good or service through the private market, his vulnerability to the political branches 
with respect to that good or service is less. Or to put it another way, where citizens have access 
to that private market, private providers mitigate their vulnerability to the political branches. 
 
35
 Vitale, above n 20. 
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I submit that via their social rights judgments, courts can likewise mitigate citizens’ 
vulnerability to the political branches with respect to social rights-related goods and services. 
In parallel to private providers, courts can serve as an alternative source of those goods and 
services. Where a court has broad powers of judicial review, including broad remedial powers 
(which is so in most constitutional democracies), the court maintains control (albeit indirect 
control) over the goods and services. It can demand that the political branches provide a citizen 
with a good or service or reimburse the citizen where she has already paid for the good or 
service from another source. And owing to their control in this regard, courts can offer citizens 
another source, alternative to the political branches, of social rights-related goods and services. 
In order to mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches, it is not enough, 
however, that a court has control over social rights-related goods and services. The court may 
not be willing to exert its control over those goods and services. And if that is the case, the 
court is only theoretically an alternative source. A court must, rather, signal, in its social rights 
judgments, that it is willing to exert its control, thereby establishing itself as an alternative 
source of those goods and services for citizens. To so signal, a court must give social rights 
substantive content, interpreting social rights as substantive material entitlements, and grant 
claimants ‘simple’ or individualised relief that provides those claimants with the good or 
service that they seek.36 In doing so, the court indicates to citizens, as prospective claimants in 
future social rights cases before the court, that if the political branches do not provide them 
with a good or service that they need, citizens may turn to the court for that good or service. 
The South African Constitutional Court, for example, in its social rights judgments to 
date, has not signalled its willingness to exert its control over social rights-related goods and 
services. In applying its ‘reasonableness review’ approach, the court has preferred to interpret 
 
36
 On the difference between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ remedies, see K Roach, ‘Dialogic Remedies’ (2019) 17 
International J of Constitutional Law 860. See also D Landau, ‘Choosing Between Simple and Complex Remedies 
in Socio-Economic Rights Cases’ (2019) 69 University of Toronto Law J 105. 
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its constitution’s social rights provisions as guarantees of a more procedural nature, as opposed 
to substantive material entitlements; and its preferred remedies have been on the ‘weaker’ side, 
leaving the political branches with more discretion as to how to satisfy their obligations.37 This 
judicial approach militates against mitigating citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches. 
Now, contrast the South African court’s approach with the individualised enforcement 
model that dominates right-to-health adjudication in many Latin American countries.38 In that 
model, the court interprets right-to-health provisions as protecting individually enforceable 
rights and, where it finds a violation, grants the claimant immediate, individualised relief in the 
form of the medical treatment that is being sought. An extensively studied example is the 
Brazilian case. The Brazilian Federal Constitution guarantees the right to health in Article 196, 
declaring health a ‘right of all and a duty of the State’. It provides that the right ‘shall be 
guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and 
other hazards and at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, 
protection and recovery’. In the late 1990s, the Supreme Federal Tribunal interpreted this right 
as ‘an individual entitlement to the satisfaction of one’s health needs with the most advanced 
treatment available, irrespective of costs’.39 And following on from that interpretation, courts 
in Brazil have used the right to order their government to provide individuals with treatments 
for various health conditions, including diabetes, HIV/AIDS, Parkinson’s disease, hepatitis C, 
Alzheimer’s disease and multiple sclerosis. The ‘Brazilian model’ for right-to-health 
 
37 See D Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification of Socio-Economic Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Tushnet, above n 23; F Veriava, ‘The Limpopo Textbook Litigation: A Case 
Study into the Possibilities of a Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2016) 32 South African J on Human Rights 
321. 
38 See Landau, above n 2, p 199; D Landau, ‘South African Social Rights Jurisprudence and the Global Canon: A 
Revisionist View’ in R Dixon and T Roux (eds) Constitutional Triumphs, Constitutional Disappointments: A 
Critical Account of the 1996 South African Constitution’s Local and International Influence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) p 410. 
39 Ferraz (2009), above n 2, p 34. 
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adjudication is thus characterised ‘by a prevalence of individualized claims demanding curative 
medical treatment (most often drugs) and by an extremely high success rate for the litigant’.40 
By interpreting the right to health as an individually enforceable right and granting 
claimants immediate, individualised relief in the form of medical treatments, the Brazilian 
court has presented itself to citizens as an alternative source of those treatments. It has signalled 
to holders of the right that if (or more likely, when) their government refuses to provide them 
with a medical treatment that they need, they can turn to the court to obtain it. The court thus 
operates as a ‘partial replacement’ or ‘substitute’ for the government.41 And by offering its 
citizens this alternative, I suggest, it has mitigated citizens’ vulnerability to their government. 
It must be clarified, however, that in signalling their willingness to exert their control 
over social rights-related goods and services and establishing themselves as an alternative 
source of those goods and services, courts do not mitigate the vulnerability of all citizens. They 
mitigate the vulnerability of only those citizens who have access (financially and otherwise) to 
the courts. Just as a private provider’s ability to mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political 
branches depends on whether citizens can afford the private market, social rights judgments 
only mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches to the extent that citizens can take 
advantage of the alternative access that courts offer. For low-income citizens who do not have 
the meaningful option of litigating their social rights, courts do not mitigate their vulnerability. 
 This point aligns with the equity criticism that the individualised enforcement model 
has received to date in the social rights literature.42 Writers have criticised the model because 
its by-product, it has been argued, is to direct resources to higher-income groups, who have the 
resources to litigate their social rights, rather than the poor or marginalised.43 Because 
 
40 Ibid. 
41 Landau, above n 2, p 232. 
42 See Bilchitz, above n 38, p 203; Chilton and Versteeg, above n 16, p 720; Ferraz (2009), above n 2. For an 
opposing (or at least less critical) view, see Landau and Dixon, above n 4, p 110. 
43 Chilton and Versteeg, ibid. 
 16 
litigation, as we know, is both expensive and time-consuming, there is ‘a natural tendency to 
skew litigation toward higher-income groups because they are more likely to have the resources 
to learn their rights and hire an effective lawyer’, and they are in a position to wait for a judicial 
resolution.44 It effectively enables those in higher-income groups to ‘queue-jump’.45 In fact, 
the empirical work on the impact of social rights judgments in various jurisdictions supports 
this conclusion.46 Octàvio Ferraz’s work on the right to health in Brazil, for instance, has shown 
that litigation has ‘by and large diverted an increasingly larger amount of the already severely 
limited health budget to health treatments of dubious effectiveness and priority (mostly 
expensive new medicines) to a minority of people who are capable to litigate’.47 And because 
this contradicts an implicit assumption held by scholars and advocates of social rights – that 
the key beneficiaries of courts’ social rights judgments will be the most poor and marginalised 
– the individualised model is viewed, as I said earlier, as a ‘betrayal or capture of these rights’.48 
My analysis here does not take a position on this criticism per se. It rather supplements 
it with a relational understanding of the individualised enforcement model, rooted in the 
concept of vulnerability. The relational impact of the model, I have claimed, is to mitigate – 
albeit unequally – the vulnerability of citizens. And this mitigated vulnerability yields unequal 
impact on the more tangible measures identified by others, including citizens’ health outcomes. 
That said, a court does not need to adopt an individualised enforcement model to 
establish itself as an alternative source of social rights-related goods and services. The court 
only needs to grant successful claimants immediate, individualised relief which provides them 
with the good or service that they seek. The court can use, for instance, what Kent Roach calls 
‘two-track remedial strategies’ that ‘combine more immediate relief for successful litigants 
 
44 Landau and Dixon, above n 4, p 115. 
45 Roach, above n 37. 
46
 Hoffmann and Bentes, above n 2; Ferraz (2009), above n 2; Ferraz (2011), above n 2; Ferraz (2021), above n 
2; Landau, above n 2. 
47 Ferraz (2021), ibid, pp 2-3. 
48 Landau and Dixon, above n 4, pp 111, 113. 
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with longer-term processes designed to achieve systemic reform for both the litigants and 
similar groups.’49 By granting successful claimants immediate relief – even though that relief 
is combined with structural or collective relief that extends beyond the claimants – the court 
signals its willingness to exert its control over social rights-related goods and services; and 
citizens know that in the future, they can turn to the court to obtain a needed good or service. 
One concrete example of this is the right-to-health jurisprudence of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court. Like the Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal, the Colombian court has 
often adopted an individualised model in enforcing its right to health. It has done so specifically 
via the ‘tutela’ – a device entitling a person to bring action before any judge ‘for the immediate 
protection of his fundamental rights when that person fears they may be violated by the action 
or omission of any public authority’.50 And as in Brazil, claimants have successfully brought 
forth tutelas in court to demand medical treatments from their government. In addition to 
providing individualised relief, however, the Colombian court has also issued, as David Landau 
has documented, structural remedies that require regulatory authorities to take steps to rectify 
some of ‘the major problems in the system that were driving the individual litigation’.51 It has 
therefore used a two-track remedial strategy, granting claimants individualised relief so that 
they can obtain the medical treatments that they need, while issuing structural remedies that 
extend beyond those claimants to address some of the more systemic problems. And as the 
court’s structural remedies have been in addition to, not instead of, individualised relief, with 
the court not abandoning or even discouraging claimants from bringing individual tutelas,52 the 
court has continued to offer itself as an alternative source of medical treatments to its citizens 
which, I suggest, has in turn mitigated the citizens’ vulnerability to their government. 
 
49 K Roach, ‘The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights’ in M Langford (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) p 57. See also Landau, above n 37. 
50 Constitution of Colombia, cited in Landau, above n 2, p 205 (fn 67). 
51 Landau, above n 37, p 109. 
52 Ibid, pp 109-110. 
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To be clear, as I indicated at the outset of the article, I am not proposing here that courts 
should mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches with respect to social rights-
related goods and services. Nor am I suggesting that the mitigated vulnerability of citizens to 
the political branches is necessarily a good thing. The judicial approach described above which 
mitigates citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches is arguably problematic for reasons of 
institutional legitimacy and capacity, violating the separation of powers and amounting to the 
judicial usurpation of the political branches’ responsibilities. Furthermore, as the critics of the 
individualised enforcement model have pointed out, it raises serious issues of equity, especially 
when individualised relief is not combined with systemic remedies. Rather than advocate that 
courts mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches, I have simply sought to 
demonstrate how courts, via their social rights judgments, can mitigate citizens’ vulnerability. 
Lastly, as I noted at the beginning of this section, courts can also augment citizens’ 
vulnerability to the political branches. Specifically, where a court has already established itself 
as an alternative source of social rights-related goods and services, it can augment citizens’ 
vulnerability by establishing a new precedent signalling that it is no longer willing to exert its 
control over those goods and services. By doing so, the court eliminates itself as an alternative 
source of those goods and services for citizens, leaving citizens with one less source of the 
goods and services. And this augments citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches. For the 
reasons detailed earlier, however, I have not focused here on this form of relational impact. 
(b) Reducing citizens’ uncertainty and promoting the political branches’ trustworthiness 
Another form of relational impact that courts can have via their social rights judgments is to 
modify citizens’ uncertainty about how the political branches will exercise their control over 
social rights-related goods and services. This includes citizens’ uncertainty about whether the 
relevant political actors will follow fair procedures and whether they will base their decisions 
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on the best available evidence. And based on my reading of the literature on trust, by modifying 
this uncertainty, courts can impact the political branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social 
rights. As with the previous section, courts can both reduce and augment citizens’ uncertainty. 
For this illustration, however, I again focus on the former – that is, the reduction of citizens’ 
uncertainty which, in turn, promotes the political branches’ trustworthiness. And I do so for 
the same reasons as last time: I think that courts are much more likely to reduce citizens’ 
uncertainty than augment it; and I again assume that most readers would not want to foster a 
citizen-government relationship in which the political branches are less trustworthy. 
To develop my argument that courts can reduce citizens’ uncertainty and promote the 
political branches’ trustworthiness, I will start with what the concept of trustworthiness means. 
Trustworthiness follows on from the concept of trust. As the term itself suggests, 
trustworthiness implies that an actor is worthy of our trust in them.53 It represents the likelihood 
that that actor will fulfil our trust in them, thereby proving their trust-worthiness. The more 
likely they are to fulfil our trust in them, the more trustworthy they are. And so, for the political 
branches to be ‘trustworthy’ means that they are likely to fulfil citizens’ trust in them. 
Given this link, before we can understand trustworthiness, we must first understand 
trust. While trust, it is well-recognised in the literature, operates at multiple levels, including 
affective and behavioural levels, my focus here will be on trust at the cognitive level. In other 
words, I am interested in trust at the level of thoughts or beliefs held by the trusting party. At 
the cognitive level, trust is a set of expectations that we hold about another actor with respect 
 
53 See A Baier, ‘What is Trust?’ in D Archard et al (eds) Reading Onora O’Neill (New York: Routledge, 2013) p 
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to some trusted subject matter.54 And trustworthiness, it therefore follows, is the likelihood of 
that actor fulfilling those expectations. Specifically, trust is commonly defined in terms of two 
expectations: goodwill and competence.55 In trusting an actor we expect that actor (i) to 
exercise goodwill towards us, and (ii) to be competent with respect to the trusted subject matter. 
Accordingly, if we apply this definition of trust to the citizen-government relationship, for 
citizens to ‘trust’ the political branches, specifically with respect to social rights-related goods 
and services (or more briefly, with respect to social rights), means that citizens expect the 
political branches to exercise goodwill towards them in exercising their control over social 
rights-related goods and services, and for them to be competent to exercise that control. And it 
therefore follows once again that for the political branches to be trustworthy with respect to 
social rights means that the political branches are likely to fulfil these two expectations. The 
more likely the political branches are to fulfil the expectations, the more trustworthy they are. 
In a political relationship like the citizen-government relationship, the expectation of 
goodwill translates (at least in significant part) into an expectation of procedural fairness.56 Fair 
procedures signify that a trusted party, like the political branches, ‘“means well,” that is, the 
party appears to want to live up to its commitments’.57 This suggests that in trusting the political 
branches with respect to social rights, citizens expect the political branches to adopt fair 
procedures when exercising their control over social rights-related goods and services. And 
accordingly, for the political branches to be trustworthy means, as Margaret Levi explains, that 
they have ‘procedures for making and implementing policy that meet prevailing standards of 
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fairness’.58 While the specifics of procedural fairness, including what exactly comprises trust’s 
expectation of goodwill, are debatable, the literature on trust recognises that at a minimum, 
procedural fairness includes transparency and participation (or ‘voice’): political actors must 
publish and provide ‘timely and relevant information to [evaluate their] performance’ and they 
must ensure that the ‘voice’ of those affected is heard in the decision-making process.59 
The second expectation of trust, competence, maps onto an expectation that the political 
branches, in exercising their control over social rights-related goods and services, will base 
their decisions on the best available evidence.60 In exercising their control over the relevant 
goods and services, the political branches make decisions – including which goods and services 
to fund and deliver, how much to invest in social welfare programmes, and who will be covered 
by the programmes – in order to serve policy ends. Scientific research, by offering insights into 
which policy initiatives are the most effective to achieve those ends, is thus of critical value. 
And the political branches are trustworthy where they base their decisions on such evidence.61 
Now, relevant to my claim that courts, via their judgments, can promote the political 
branches’ trustworthiness, there is an established line of thinking in the literature on trust that 
the trustworthiness of a party, like the political branches, can be promoted by constraining the 
discretion exercised by that party in carrying out whatever functions have been entrusted to 
them.62 For this reason writers on trust distinguish between ‘personal’ (or primary) trust and 
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‘impersonal’ (or secondary) trust.63 Whereas personal trust refers to trust that we have in a 
trusted party based on what we know about their character, impersonal trust refers to trust based 
on our knowledge of the constraints that have been imposed on them. In both cases of trust, we 
expect goodwill and competence from the trusted party – but for different reasons. With 
personal trust, we expect goodwill and competence because we believe that the trusted party is 
of good character; and that good character, we think, makes them trustworthy. We cannot be 
sure, but we believe that they are likely to fulfil our expectations of goodwill and competence 
because they are a good person. With impersonal trust, we expect goodwill and competence 
from the trusted party because the constraints that have been imposed on them make goodwill 
and competence likely. The constraints, in other words, make the trusted party trustworthy. 
This line of thinking, I propose, can be applied to the citizen-government relationship, 
and courts in their oversight of that relationship. So applied, it suggests that by imposing 
constraints on the political branches’ discretion vis-à-vis social rights-related goods and 
services, courts can, via their social rights judgments, promote the trustworthiness of the 
political branches with respect to social rights. By imposing these constraints, courts reduce 
citizens’ uncertainty about how the political branches will exercise their control over social 
rights-related goods and services. Put simply, the constraints, imposed by courts in their 
judgments, offer citizens more certainty about the how that control will be exercised. 
Specifically, based on the conceptualisation of trust and trustworthiness detailed above, 
courts promote the trustworthiness of the political branches where they constrain the political 
branches’ discretion so as to make it more likely that they will fulfil citizens’ trust-based 
expectations of goodwill (that is, that the political branches will adopt fair procedures in 
making decisions about the relevant goods and services) and competence (that is, that they will 
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base their decisions on the best available evidence). To the extent that a social rights judgment 
makes the fulfilment of either of these expectations more likely, it promotes the political 
branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social rights. Hence, and more concretely, a social 
rights judgment promotes such trustworthiness where that judgment creates an obligation on 
the political branches to (i) follow fair procedures when making decisions about the relevant 
goods and services, (ii) base their decisions on the best available evidence, or (iii) both. 
A good example of judgments that fit category (i) is the social rights jurisprudence of 
the South African Constitutional Court, specifically on reasonableness review. While the vague 
criteria first set out by Yacoob J in Grootboom do very little to require procedural fairness from 
government actors vis-à-vis social welfare programmes,64 since Grootboom, the court has 
elaborated reasonableness review to make it more concrete and, more importantly for my 
purpose, to incorporate elements of procedural fairness. And in doing so, I submit, the court’s 
social rights judgments have done work to promote the South African government’s 
trustworthiness. In the well-known TAC decision, for instance, the court incorporated into 
reasonableness review government transparency. It explained that a reasonable social welfare 
programme must be transparent such that ‘its contents must be made known appropriately’ to 
all concerned.65 The court concluded that the public health programme at issue there (which 
restricted the availability of the antiretroviral drug Nevirapine to limited research and training 
sites in South Africa) was unreasonable, at least in part, because of the government’s lack of 
transparency. The court stressed that remedying the ‘HIV/AIDS challenge facing the country’ 
required ‘proper communication, especially by government’, and in concluding that there had 
been a violation of the right to health vis-à-vis the government’s Nevirapine programme, the 
court found that communication of this standard was simply not evident.66 And more recently, 
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the court has incorporated an element of participation into reasonableness review via the 
remedy of ‘meaningful engagement’.67 In Olivia Road, for example, occupiers of two buildings 
in the inner city of Johannesburg challenged an order granted by a lower court authorising the 
City of Johannesburg to evict the occupiers on the basis that those buildings were unsafe and 
unhealthy.68 As part of its resolution of the case, the court issued an order ‘aimed at ensuring 
that the City and the occupiers engaged with each other meaningfully on certain issues’, 
including on the issue of how to make ‘the buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is 
reasonably practicable’.69 The court required, in essence, that the building’s occupiers be given 
an opportunity to participate in the City’s decision-making process around eviction, as well as 
the safety and health of the buildings. Of note, while meaningful engagement was only a 
remedy ordered, the court rooted the requirement to ‘meaningfully engage’ in the government’s 
overarching obligation to take ‘reasonable measures’. Accordingly, the judgment’s ultimate 
effect was, as Anashri Pillay explains, to include as a ‘factor for a court to consider in 
evaluating the reasonableness of government action’ the question of meaningful engagement.70 
The jurisprudence of UK courts regarding the rationing of medical treatment in the 
National Health Service (NHS) offers another illustration. Now, granted, unlike the other 
jurisdictions considered in this article (eg, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia), the UK does not 
have a codified constitution. Accordingly, it does not have constitutional social rights – at least 
not in the traditional sense.71 However, as I noted earlier, my arguments in this article are not 
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necessarily limited to constitutional social rights: courts’ enforcement or application of 
legislative social rights can likewise have relational impact. And in the UK, social rights are 
protected under various statutes, including the National Health Service Acts.72 Moreover, while 
the UK does not have constitutional social rights, as I will explain shortly, UK courts have 
taken steps to protect social welfare, drawing on their body of public law, which courts in 
jurisdictions with constitutional social rights could likewise take (or at least parallel). 
Consequently, in my view, UK cases, despite these differences, offer a good source to illustrate 
relational impact. As Daniel Wang has documented, UK courts, relying on various grounds of 
judicial review, have scrutinised NHS rationing decisions both for procedural fairness 
(illustrating category (i)) and for the evidence used to make those decisions (illustrating 
category (ii)).73 The A, D and G case well-illustrates category (ii).74 In that case, the Court of 
Appeal challenged a local health authority’s refusal to fund gender reassignment surgery on 
the basis that the authority’s scientific assessment had not engaged with existing evidence that 
the surgery was an effective treatment for gender identity dysphoria. Under the National Health 
Service Act 1977 (in combination with relevant regulations), the local health authority had a 
duty to provide ‘to such extent as [it] considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements 
… such … services as are required for the diagnosis and treatment of illness’. Until 1995, the 
authority had funded gender reassignment surgery where a local consultant psychiatrist 
recommended it as necessary. But in 1995, the authority adopted a policy that allocated a low 
priority for public funding of procedures that it considered clinically ineffective – and gender 
reassignment surgery, according to the policy, which was classified as falling in the lowest 10 
per cent in terms of priority, would not be funded ‘except in cases of overriding clinical need’. 
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The Court of Appeal quashed the health authority’s decision not to fund the surgery, 
along with the policy on which it was based, and remitted the matter to the authority for 
reconsideration. Lord Justice Auld reasoned that while it was not the judiciary’s place ‘to 
express opinions as to the likelihood of the effectiveness of medical treatment’, the health 
authority’s refusal to engage with the evidence, and its follow-on conclusion that there was no 
effective treatment for gender identity dysphoria, made a ‘nonsense’ of its policy not to fund 
low-priority treatments ‘except in cases of overriding clinical need’.75 The policy, he said, 
effectively amounted to ‘the operation of a “blanket policy” against funding treatment for the 
condition [gender identity dysphoria] because it [the health authority] does not believe in such 
treatment’.76 In a concurring judgment, Lord Justice Buxton explained that where there is ‘a 
strong and respectable body of medical opinion’ that considers a treatment to be effective and 
suitable (as was the case with gender reassignment surgery), it is ‘not open to a rational health 
authority simply to determine that a procedure has no proven clinical benefit while giving no 
indication of why it considers that that is so’.77 And so, Lord Justice Buxton concluded, the 
health authority’s refusal to engage with this evidence rendered its rationing decision irrational. 
The above set of social rights judgments, I submit, promote the trustworthiness of the 
relevant government actors. The South African and UK courts, via their respective judgments, 
have constrained the relevant actors’ discretion vis-à-vis social rights-related goods and 
services (that is, medical treatments in TAC and A, D and G, and housing in Olivia Road), 
obliging them to adopt fair procedures in making decisions about the goods and services, to 
base their decisions on the best available evidence, or both. And in so obliging the actors, these 
courts have made it more likely that those actors will fulfil citizens’ trust-based expectations 
of goodwill and competence when making decisions about the relevant goods and services. 
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I should clarify two points. First, the ‘constraint’ imposed by the court on the political 
branches can come from either (or both) how the court interprets the social right in question 
and the remedy that the court orders in response to a decided social rights violation. In the 
former case, the court interprets a social right as obliging the political branches to follow fair 
procedures or to base their decisions on the best available evidence. This is what the South 
African court did, for instance, in TAC vis-à-vis reasonableness and transparency. It interpreted 
the right to health in section 27 of its constitution as obliging the government to introduce 
reasonable public health programmes, and it defined a reasonable public health programme as 
one which is transparent. In the latter case, the court grants the claimants in a particular case a 
remedy that obliges a government actor to follow fair procedures in that particular situation or 
to base a specific decision on the best evidence. This is what the court did in Olivia Road vis-
à-vis meaningful engagement. It ordered the City of Johannesburg to engage meaningfully with 
the occupiers of the two buildings on the relevant issues, thereby requiring their participation. 
Second, because the concept of trustworthiness as conceptualised represents the 
likelihood of expectations (of goodwill and competence) being fulfilled, and expectations are 
thoughts or beliefs about events in the future, it follows that for a social rights judgment to 
promote the political branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social rights, the judgment must 
have what we can describe as ‘prospective effect’. By this, I mean that the judgment must 
constrain the political branches’ future conduct so as to make it more likely that the political 
branches will act with goodwill and/or competence in their future interactions with citizens. 
Granted, most social rights judgments will have some prospective effect. A prospective 
effect may result, for instance, from a judgment’s precedential value or from government actors 
fearing litigation and corresponding judicial repercussions, with them perceiving judges as 
 28 
being ‘over their shoulders’.78 When the South African Constitutional Court introduced 
reasonableness review, for example, government actors responded with ‘Grootboom-proofing’ 
of social policy.79 But the more a court can maximise the prospective effect of its social rights 
judgment, the more, I submit, it will promote the political branches’ trustworthiness. 
For example, where the constraint on the political branches’ discretion vis-à-vis social 
rights-related goods and services comes from the remedy ordered by the court in response to a 
decided social rights violation, the trustworthiness of the political branches can be promoted 
further, I suggest, by ‘institutionalising’ that remedy. As Brian Ray explains, to institutionalise 
a remedy, government actors must adopt measures that ‘ensure systematic implementation’ of 
that remedy such that they ‘work to develop a more generalised capacity’ for the remedy 
‘outside of specific projects’.80 The remedy, in other words, must not be a one-off response to 
the specific situation in the case; but rather integrated into the government’s broader decision-
making process. By institutionalising a remedy that obliges a government actor in making 
decisions vis-à-vis social rights-related goods and services to follow fair procedures or to base 
their decisions on the best available evidence, those ideas – that is, procedural fairness and 
evidence-based decision-making – become part of the political branches’ decision-making 
process vis-à-vis the relevant goods and services. And it is thus more likely that the political 
branches will fulfil citizens’ trust-based expectations in their future interactions with citizens. 
So, it follows that the more a court can further a remedy’s institutionalisation in its judgment, 
the more it can promote the political branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social rights. 
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This is what the South African Constitutional Court did in Olivia Road. By rooting the 
remedy of meaningful engagement in the government’s overarching duty to take ‘reasonable 
measures’, it furthered the institutionalisation of engagement. By doing so, I submit, it further 
promoted the trustworthiness of the South African government with respect to social rights. 
Another concrete example is the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Nzolameso where the 
court furthered the institutionalisation of greater transparency in local authorities’ decision-
making about temporary accommodation provision to its homeless residents.81 The claimant 
and her children lived in Westminster in a privately rented house paid for with housing benefits. 
But with the introduction of a benefit cap, the house became unaffordable for the claimant, 
rendering her and her children homeless. Under legislation, local authorities like Westminster 
had a duty to provide accommodation in their own area (that is, ‘in borough’) ‘so far as 
reasonably practicable’.82 Westminster City Council, claiming a shortage of accommodation 
in Westminster, offered the claimant a house ‘out of borough’ (approximately one hour and 15 
minutes from Westminster). The Supreme Court, on an application for judicial review, held 
that Westminster had acted unlawfully. And in so holding, Lady Hale, who wrote the court’s 
judgment, issued ‘guidance’ to local authorities to be applied by them when making temporary 
accommodation decisions so as to make this public decision-making process more transparent. 
Lady Hale specifically stated that ‘each local authority should have, and keep up to 
date, a policy for procuring sufficient units of temporary accommodation to meet the 
anticipated demand during the coming year’.83 That policy should reflect the local authority’s 
statutory obligations and should be approved by the democratically accountable members of 
the council. She also asserted that ‘each local authority should have, and keep up to date, a 
policy for allocating those units to individual homeless households’.84 Where the council 
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anticipates a shortfall of ‘in borough’ units, the policy should explain ‘the factors which would 
be taken into account in offering households those units’, ‘the factors which would be taken 
into account in offering units close to home’ and where a shortage exists, ‘the factors which 
would make it suitable to accommodate a household further away’.85 And Lady Hale said both 
policies ‘should be made publicly available’, further promoting transparency in the process.86 
To again be fair, and as I noted at the beginning of this section, courts can also augment 
citizens’ uncertainty about how the political branches will exercise their control over social 
rights-related goods and services – and in turn, they can make the political branches less 
trustworthy. This would be the case, I suggest, where a court removed previously-imposed 
constraints on the political branches (eg, under statute or common law) that required them to 
follow fair procedures or to base their decisions on the best available evidence. By removing 
these constraints, the court would make goodwill and competence from the political branches 
less likely and therefore lessen their trustworthiness with respect to social rights. But again, for 
the reasons detailed earlier, I have not focused here on this form of relational impact. 
Lastly, a reader may ask: what about citizens’ trust in the courts? Surely the two 
expectations of trust which I have described here would apply to courts in their enforcement of 
social rights? This is true. Because trust is best conceptualised as a network of interconnected 
and interdependent relationships, we could consider the operation of trust in various 
relationships, including that between citizens and the courts.87 However, as my focus in this 
article has been the citizen-government relationship (as I identified at the outset), I have not 
considered trust and trustworthiness in these other relationships. And while those relationships 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to the growing literature on the impact of social rights judgments, as 
well as the social rights literature more broadly, by introducing and examining what I have 
described as the ‘relational’ impact of these judgments. Courts are very frequently criticised 
for not doing enough in their social rights judgments to help realise citizens’ social rights. At 
the core of these critiques is often the judgments’ distributive impact. It is assumed that to 
realise citizens’ social rights, courts’ enforcement of the rights must deliver social rights-
related goods and services to the poor and marginalised. If it does not, the courts, and social 
rights jurisprudence, are treated as ineffective – or at least, as significantly underperforming. 
This article has not sought to challenge these evaluative arguments. The distributive 
impact of social rights judgments is undoubtedly an important aspect of realising citizens’ 
social rights. As much of the social rights literature assumes, these rights are intended to be 
transformative in nature, with their greatest beneficiaries being the poor and marginalised.88 
And the judicial enforcement of social rights, in line with common arguments in support of 
social rights’ justiciability, offers poor and marginalised citizens a forum to better protect their 
interests (as compared with the democratic process in which they have minimal influence). So, 
rather than challenge the above evaluative arguments, this article has instead sought to add 
some much-needed nuance to them, contributing to the existing literature on ‘the broader 
impact’ of social rights judgments. I have argued that in addition to their distributive impact, 
courts, via their judgments, can have differential impact on the dynamics at play in the citizen-
government relationship – specifically by modifying certain elements of that relationship. And 
to illustrate this relational impact, I have drawn on the literature on trust to demonstrate two 
forms of such impact: how courts can mitigate citizens’ vulnerability to the political branches 
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with respect to social rights-related goods and services, and how they can reduce citizens’ 
uncertainty to promote the political branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social rights. 
By broadening our understanding of the impact that social rights judgments have, the 
article offers a valuable lens through which to analyse these judgments and evaluate their 
effectiveness. Though a social rights judgment may not deliver the relevant goods and services 
to the poor and marginalised, it may have an impact on the relationship between citizens and 
the political branches. For instance, as I have noted, the South African Constitutional Court’s 
Grootboom judgment did not deliver public housing to Irene Grootboom. It did, however, set 
out for the first time the court’s ‘reasonableness review’ approach to enforcing social rights 
which, since Grootboom, has incorporated elements of procedural fairness like transparency 
and participation. And in doing so, I have argued, the Constitutional Court has promoted the 
South African government’s trustworthiness with respect to social rights. In my view, this 
relational impact analysis casts the Grootboom judgment, and its effectiveness in realising 
South Africans’ social rights, in a different light. It adds a new dimension to the judgment and 
perhaps challenges our expectations of what a social rights judgment ought to achieve. With 
its broader understanding of social rights judgments’ impact, this article thus enables us to 
think more deeply about the role that courts can, and should, play in social rights enforcement. 
 
